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In a recent civil case, the Court of Final Appeal decided to make a reference to 
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress under Art 158(3) 
o f the Basic Law to interpret certain other provisions of the Basic Law central 
to the issues and outcome of the case. By applying the constitutional game ana-
lytical framework, this article analyses why the Court of Final Appeal initiated 
the reference procedure in the way that it did.
Introduction
There are many constitutional taboos in the Basic Law of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region (the Basic Law). Constitutional taboos 
include ambiguous constitutional provisions in the Basic Law which 
should be clarifi ed to clear doubts on their scope of application and con-
stitutional mechanisms required to be set up by the Basic Law or needed 
for the smooth operation of Hong Kong’s constitutional order but are 
intentionally overlooked or untouched by all political actors owing to 
their political sensitivity. They all want to avoid the intense political 
controversy that may be generated from any attempt to clarify the mean-
ing or to establish the mechanism. 
One of those constitutional taboos is the procedure to make a ref-
erence to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
(SCNPC) by the Court of Final Appeal (the CFA) to interpret provi-
sions of the Basic Law under certain conditions provided in Art 158(3) 
of the Basic Law (the reference procedure).1 Recently, in the adjudica-
tion of a civil dispute, the CFA initiated the reference procedure for the 
fi rst time. 
* Associate Professor, University of Hong Kong, LLB, PCLL (HKU), LLM (London).
1 The other constitutional taboos may include the enactment to implement Art 23 of the Basic 
Law, the constitutional status of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
under Art 39 of the Basic Law, and the relative legal status of national laws listed in Annex III 
of the Basic Law as against legislation enacted by the Legislative Council.
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The Case
In Democratic Republic of the Congo v FG Hemisphere Associates LLC2 the 
plaintiff, a company based in the United States launched proceedingsin 
the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) 
against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to enforce its 
rights in two arbitration awardsover a certain amount of money payable 
by a Chinese enterprise to the DRC representing an asset of the DRC in 
Hong Kong. 
The DRC asserted that the HK courts have no jurisdiction over it 
in respect of the subject matter of the claim according to the legal prin-
ciple of state immunity. As one of the major legal issues in this case, the 
DRC alleged that the courts of the HKSAR should follow the practice 
of the People’s Republic of China, HK mother state, that “a state and 
its property shall, in foreign courts, enjoy absolute immunity, including 
absolute immunity from jurisdiction and from execution”.3 On that basis, 
the courts of the HKSAR would still have no jurisdiction over the acts 
of the DRC in this case even if those acts were ruled to be commercial 
in nature. However, the plaintiff argued that the courts of the HKSAR 
should continue to apply the doctrine of restrictive immunity, which was 
the common law principle applicable in Hong Kong before the transfer 
of sovereignty in 1997. According to the doctrine of restrictive immu-
nity, only sovereign acts are immune but not commercial acts. 
On the question whether the courts of the HKSAR should apply the 
doctrine of absolute immunity or restrictive immunity, the CFA by a 
majority of three-to-two decided that it involved the interpretation of 
Art 13 and Art 19 of the Basic Law and resolved to seek an interpreta-
tion of the provisions from the SCNPC in accordance with Art 158(3) 
of the Basic Law before making the fi nal rulings in the case.
In this comment I do not intend to provide an analysis of the legal 
questions involved in the case, such aswhat is the legal doctrine of 
state immunity under common law? Does the common law doctrine of 
state immunity continue to apply in the HKSAR? Has state immunity 
been waived in this case? What is the nature of the act of the DRC in 
this case? I may not even directly consider the legal test applied by the 
CFA in determining whether an interpretation should be sought from 
the SCNPC. Rather, I would like to apply an analytical framework of 
2 [2011] 4 HKC 151.
3 See the First letter from the Offi ce of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the 
Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau of the HKSAR government and was placed by the 
Secretary for Justice before the Court of First Instance in the hearing of the case.
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constitutional game to explain why the CFA has chosen this case to 
initiate the reference procedure provided in Art 158(3) of the Basic Law 
and why it has adopted the particular form and manner in making the 
referral in this case. 
The Constitutional Game Analytical Framework
Like any game, there must be rules and players. In a constitutional game, 
the constitution is the rule of the game and all political actors involved 
in the constitutional processes are the players like the judiciary adjudi-
cating a constitutional dispute.4
Like all games, players play to win. The winning goal of a player in a 
constitutional game is very much related to the institutional role or goal 
assigned to him or her by the constitution. This is also the constitutional 
position of a player in a constitutional game.5
A player will use the game resources provided to him or her by the 
constitution and make moves to win. Interaction between the players is 
the key to any game, including a constitutional game. To win a game, a 
player must respond to the moves of other players. On the basis of the 
perception of possible actions of other players, a player will develop a 
strategy in takinghis or her moves and using his or her game resources in 
order to have his or her winning goals achieved. 
All players are expected to play according to the rules. Moves that 
will be accepted by other players as legitimate are only acts that can, in 
the end, fi nd authority from the rules. In other words, the constitution in 
a constitutional game imposes limits on the kind of actions a player can 
take and the strategy he or she can adopt in playing the game.
The provisions of the constitution, however, areusually not accurate, 
owing to the nature of language. There are times when language cannot 
indicate clearly the institutional role of a player, the exact boundary of 
the game resources available to a player and whether a move taken by a 
player is legitimate. 
The ambiguities in the constitutional provisions allow room for a 
playerto determine and review his or her role, powers and limitations in 
the constitutional game by giving a certain reading to the constitutional 
provisions. A player may justify his or her moves by reading the rules 
4 “Basic Law, Basic Politics: The Constitutional Game of Hong Kong,” (2007) 37 HKLJ 503–578.
5 Benny Y. T. Tai, “Chapter One of Hong Kong’s New Constitution: Constitutional Positioning 
and Repositioning,” in Ming Chan and Alvin Y. So (ed) Crisis and Transformation of China’s 
Hong Kong (M. E. Sharpe, 2002).
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expansively so as to maximisethe chance in achieving his or her winning 
goals. However, the understanding of the constitutional provisions by a 
player on his or her role, powers and limitations may not be the same as 
or may even be in confl ict with how other players in the game see the 
same. Therefore, a player in planning his or her action in a constitutional 
game must take account of how other players may interpret the consti-
tutional provisions concerning his or her acts and what possible actions 
they may take in response to his or her interpretation and actions in the 
game on the basis of their interpretations.
The Positioning of the CFA
In applying this analytical framework to look at the decision of the CFA 
to seek for an interpretation from the SCNPC in this case, we must fi rst 
identify the institutional goal of the CFA and the courts of the HKSAR. 
In other words, we have to ascertain the constitutional position of the 
CFA.6 There may not be much objection to state that the institutional 
goal highly valued by the CFA is to maintain the judicial autonomy 
and judicial authority of the courts of the HKSAR.7 To achieve this 
 institutional goal, the CFA will strive to demonstrate to the public of 
Hong Kong and other political actors that the courts of the HKSAR can 
continue to exercise their judicial power independently not affected by 
any interference from outside forces, impartially without giving prefer-
ence to any political interest, and professionally on the basis of appli-
cable lawsonly. 
However, initiating the reference procedure will inevitably hurt the 
judicial autonomy and judicial authority of the courts of the HKSAR. 
On the one hand, the CFA will not be making the fi nal ruling on all 
legal issues in the case. That will hurt the CFA’s judicial authority. On 
the other hand, the fi nal interpretation of the relevant provisions of the 
Basic Law will be given by the SCNPC, which is not a judicial body. 
That will hurt the CFA’s judicial autonomy.
For the past years, the CFA has adopted an avoidance strategy and 
tried its best not to initiate the reference procedure so as to limit the 
adverse impact of the reference procedure or to render it no more than 
6 The CFA may not expressly state its institutional goal in its judgments. The institutional goal 
may have to be derived from the underlying reasoning of the judgments of the CFA on the 
Basic Law in the past years. Another source can be the extra-judicial speeches and writings of 
senior judges of the courts of the HKSAR especially the speeches of the Chief Justice at the 
ceremonial opening of the legal year throughout the years.
7 See n 5 and Benny Y. T. Tai, “Judicial Autonomy in Hong Kong,” (2010) China Information 24 (3). 
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something on paper.8 However, in the fi rst interpretation by the SCNPC 
on the right of abode of Mainland children,9 the SCNPC has already 
indicated that the decision of the CFA in those cases10 of not seeking an 
interpretation from the SCNPC was not in compliance with the require-
ment of Art 158(3) of the Basic Law. The CFA in a subsequent case 
accepted that it would have to revisit the testin determining whether a 
reference should be made to the SCNPC for interpretationin the future.11
The reference procedure is indeed a nightmare to the CFA that it 
cannot get rid of. If in the future, the CFA is found to be in a case where 
there is no longer any room to avoid the issue, it will then be forced to 
initiate the reference procedure. The damage to the institutional goals 
of the courts of the HKSAR will be devastating. However, courts in 
the HKSAR are passive actors in the constitutional processes; they can 
only act when there is a case before them for adjudication. Courts of 
the HKSAR cannot make a ruling on constitutional issues outside the 
context of adjudication and the courts have totally no control over what 
cases will come before themselves. 
Therefore, the best way or the less damaging way to resolve the 
dilemma is for the CFA to initiate the reference procedure itself in a case 
that is not politically sensitive and use methods that will create the least 
damage to its judicial authority and judicial autonomy. The legal dispute 
in this case provides the best opportunity for the CFA to defuse this legal 
bomb.
Game in Action
There may be several reasons to explain why this case may be a good case 
for the CFA to choose as the fi rst case to initiate the reference procedure. 
First, the legal dispute in this case only involves a foreign enterprise and a 
foreign sovereign state though the dispute is over a sum of money payable 
by a Chinese enterprise to the DRC. The Central  People’s  Government 
8 P. Y. Lo. “Rethinking Judicial Reference: Barricades at the Gateway?” Hualing Fu, Lison 
Harris, Simon N.M. Young (eds) Interpreting Hong Kong’s Basic Law: The Struggle for Coherence 
(New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007),157–182and Po Jen Yap, “10 Years of the Basic 
Law: The Rise, Retreat and Resurgence of Judicial Power in Hong Kong” (2007) 36 Common 
Law World Review 166–191.
9 “Interpretation of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Article 22(4) 
and paragraph 3 of 24(2) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” 
adopted by the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress at its Tenth 
 Session on 26 June 1999.
10 Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4 and Chan Kam Nga v Director of 
Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 82.
11 Lau Kong Yung v Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 300.
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(CPG) and the HKSAR Government are not parties to the dispute, 
although the Secretary for Justice intervened to address the courts of 
the HKSAR on the position of the HKSAR Government on the con-
stitutional issues in the case, and the Offi ce of the Commissioner of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has written three letters to the courts of the 
HKSAR on the position of the CPG on state immunity. As the CPG and 
the HKSAR Government are not directly affected by the legal dispute in 
this case, to initiate the reference procedure in this case will not give an 
impression that the CFA is appeasing or submitting to the pressure of the 
CPG or the HKSAR Government. 
Second, the articles in the Basic Law involved in this case are related 
with foreign affairs. The two articles sought for interpretation are 
Art 13 and Art 19. Article 13(1) of the Basic Law provides that the 
CPG shall be responsible for the foreign affairs relating to the HKSAR. 
The interpretive question sought by the CFA is whether on the true 
interpretation of Art 13(1), the CPG has the power to determine the 
rule or policy of the PRC on state immunity. Article 19(3) of the Basic 
Law provides that the courts of the HKSAR shall have no jurisdiction 
over acts of state such as defence and foreign affairs. The interpretive 
question sought is whether the determination by the CPG as to the rule 
or policy on state immunity falls within “acts of state such as defence 
and foreign affairs”. As these questions are related with foreign affairs 
and most people will not dispute that this is a matter within the respon-
sibility of the CPG, thus the decision to make a reference may be subject 
to less challenge. 
Third, the newly appointed Chief Justice of the CFA, Justice Geof-
frey Ma, was not one of the fi ve judges adjudicating this case.12 Even if 
the decision to make a reference to the SCNPC wasto be seriously criti-
cisedby the legal community and the general public, Justice Geoffrey Ma 
will not be implicated affecting his personal authority. This can limit the 
range of damages to the CFA. 
Moreover, the Offi ce of the Commissioner of the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs has already written three letters to the courts of the HKSAR 
informing the courts about the position of the CPG on state immunity. If 
the CFA were to apply the common law doctrine of restrictive immunity 
and decide not to make a reference, one cannot preclude the possibility 
that the SCNPC will issue an interpretation on its own on the relevant 
provisions of the Basic Law after the CFA delivered the judgment. The 
damage to the judicial authority and judicial autonomy of the CFA will 
then be even more devastating. What is important is not whether the 
12 He abstained from participating in the hearing of this case as his wife is a member of the Court 
of Appeal bench that heard this case. 
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SCNPC will actually issue an interpretation on its own. If the CFA con-
siders that such an interpretation by the SCNPC is probable and the 
damage which will result is higher than initiating the reference proce-
dure itself, seeking an interpretation from the SCNPC is a rational deci-
sion by the CFA under the constitutional game analytical framework.
Further, in order to minimisethe damage that could be done to the 
judicial authority and judicial autonomy of the courts of the HKSAR, 
the CFA has also adopted several measuresin the case concerning the 
manner and form of the reference procedure. 
Frist, the CFA has delivered a very detailed judgment analysingall 
legal issues and has given provisional rulings on all the issues before seek-
ing for an interpretation on the relevant articles of the Basic Law from 
the SCNPC. This gives an impression that the CFA has not abdicated its 
judicial authority over those issues raised in the interpretative questions 
to the SCNPC. The CFA is still the fi nal arbiter of the case. 
Second, the interpretative questions that the CFA has set for the 
SCNPC are clearly defi ned. All questions can be answered almost by a 
“yes” or “no”. The interpretation to be given by the SCNPC would have 
to be focused on the specifi c legal questions raised in the case and in 
the interpretative questions. This can limit the scope of interpretation to 
be given by the SCNPC and reduce the impact of the interpretation on 
the legal system of the HKSAR. 
Third, two judges have written substantive dissenting judgments.13 
This can give an impression that the judges of the CFA can still  maintain 
their independence and integrity in deciding controversial constitutional 
issues even if the CPG holds adverse views. Fourth, in adopting the above 
form and manner in seeking an interpretation from the SCNPC, the 
panel of judges of the CFA in this case set a precedent for future panels 
of judges of the CFA by laying down demanding conditions for initiating 
the reference procedure. 
One may disagree with the decision of the CFA on the legal issues 
concerning state immunity or its decision to seek an interpretation 
from the SCNPC. However, one cannot ignore the fact that the CFA is 
indeed working in a diffi cult political environment. Therefore, its deci-
sion to seek an interpretation from the SCNPC may be considered to be 
wise though a painful one. 
13 Justice Bokhary PJ and Justice Mortimer NPJ.
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